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The government use of compulsory purchase and land use control powers appears
to be increasing worldwide as competition for usable and liveable space increases.
The need for large and relatively undeveloped space for agriculture and conser-
vation purposes often competes with the need for shelter and the commercial
and industrial development accompanying such development for employment,
product manufacture and distribution, and other largely urban uses. The free
market does not always (some would say, often) result in a logical and equitable
distribution of land use and the attendant public facilities necessary to serve the
use of land. One function of government is therefore to regulate the use of private
land for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens, and to help provide roads, wa-
ter, sanitation and other public facilities, as well as schools, parks, airports and the
like. Accomplishing the former is generally done in accordance with some form or
level of plan. Accomplishing the latter often requires the exercise of compulsory
purchase powers, providing public land or interests in land in order to construct
such public facilities or infrastructure.
The Asia-Pacific region and its rapid urbanisation has generated a need for
both land use control and the use of compulsory purchase powers. The same rapid
urbanisation and the need for accompanying public facilities has generated area-
wide interest in the mechanics (rather than the theory) of compulsory purchase
and related land use control mechanisms. While there are certain commonalities
among the 11 countries that form the basis of our comparative study, there are
differences as well, some of them (such as the ratio of public and private land
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ownership) fundamental. The purpose of our study was to summarise the prin-
cipal compulsory purchase and land use control systems in the 11 countries that
make up the basis of our comparative study, and to attempt to draw some parallels
and note some differences among them. However, any comparative study of law
and administrative practice is bound to be somewhat general if truly comparative.
Our study was no exception.
What follows in the next part are the major themes that emerged from our
study. The practices of the individual countries of the study are then summarised,
with explanation and analysis of the laws applicable to compulsory purchase and
land use control in each country.
I. Major Themes
A. Land Use Control
Virtually every country studied has some mechanism for the control of private
land use, particularly those uses most often associated with urbanisation: residen-
tial, commercial, industrial and institutional uses of land. These mechanisms range
from the relatively detailed to the relatively broad-brush, including private land
ownership; national, regional and municipal land use statutes; zoning; building
regulations; and common law. What follows is a summary of the major themes
that emerge from examining each Asia-Pacific country's concepts of land use and
planning.
B. Ownership of Land
There is some private ownership of land or rights in land in most of the countries
studied. In countries like the United States, most developable land, and virtually
all land in urban areas, is privately owned. Much the same is true in New Zealand
and Australia. However, in a significant number of countries-Malaysia, People's
Republic of China, Hong Kong and Singapore-the State owns virtually all of the
land, though in Hong Kong, it is theoretically possible for a citizen to acquire the
equivalent of a fee simple interest in government land through adverse possession
over a 60-year period. There is no record of anyone having ever done so, however.
State ownership has considerable implications for the regulation of land use. In
those States where the State owns most of the land, private development takes
place almost exclusively on leased land with the government as lessor. The lease
provides an added, sometimes the principal, method of control through lease cov-
enants, often of a sophisticated nature, as in Hong Kong. Indeed, in the People's
Republic of China and Singapore, the government retains the power to modify
unilaterally the terms of the lease. In Hong Kong, the government may reclaim
leased land for a public purpose, after paying compensation, and a lessee may
obtain a relaxation of lease restrictions on the payment of a premium.
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C. Statutory Framework
The majority of the countries studied provide for land use controls through a
national statute that either imposes a minimum level of land use control or sets
out a framework for regional and local control, or both. Indeed, only the United
States appears to be virtually silent on national land use policy respecting the
private use of land, although virtually every state has an enabling Act that permits
local land use controls through zoning. This, of course, may be due principally to
the federal nature of the United States, where most powers of an internal nature
reside with the states rather than with the national government, coupled with the
country's comparatively large land mass (only the People's Republic of China and
Australia are comparable in this sense) and historic distrust of land use control in
all but urban areas. Japan is a typical example of a country with national legis-
lation that both sets policy and provides minimum standards. Most urban areas
are required to undertake a minimum level of land use control. Each is further
required to use roughly the same dozen use zones in regulating land use. Most,
like Taiwan, further require consistency, more or less top-down, among national,
regional and local land use regulatory schemes, with the national government
setting broad policy and the local government implementing it at the construction
and development level.
D. Plans and Planning
Virtually every country integrates some sort of land use planning into the control
of land use and development. Some, like Japan and Thailand, have national plans.
Others, like the United States, have mainly local plans where there is often only
the most rudimentary of plans even at the local level. Still others, like Australia,
exercise the planning function at the state or regional level. Most countries require
conformance with the appropriate level of plan document, and further require the
compliance of the next governmental tier down with the plan immediately above.
Thus, Taiwan's three-tiered planning system begins with the national, flows to the
regional, and then to the local, with the higher tier guiding the lower.
E. Zoning
In a majority of the countries studied, the implementation of land use controls
comes at the local level, through some sort of zoning. Korea, Japan, Taiwan and
Hong Kong make it clear that such zoning must conform to the applicable, usu-
ally local, plan or planning document. The same is true with respect to most US
states through either court decision or zoning enabling Act, though conform-
ance with plans, if any, is often more honoured in the breach. Typically, such
zoning divides the jurisdiction of a local government into various residential, com-
mercial/business and industrial zones, sometimes with open space, agricultural
and institutional zones as well. The uses permitted in each zone are found in a
local (sometimes guided by national, as in Japan) zoning ordinance, resolution
or rule, together with a process, if any, for changing the zones upon petition of
the landowner/lessee/user of a parcel within a particular zone. In some of the
countries studied, such as Japan and Korea, the national government imposes a
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standard set of zoning districts on all local governments. In others, like the United
States, the choice of districts remains in the discretion of local governments, which
may choose not to zone at all. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, the zone-based
development plans govern the land use of most areas.
F Building Regulations
A surprising number of countries-Japan, Korea and Taiwan-regulate buildings
as well as land use by means of a national statute. In others, such as the United
States, building codes are the most localised of land development controls. The
result, of course, is considerable uniformity (and efficiency of construction and
development) in those countries with national codes, such as Japan, and consider-
able diversity, often accompanied by wasteful retooling for development in those
countries with local codes that are only partly ameliorated by national models, as
in the United States.
G. Courts and Common Law
The United States appears to be alone in its reliance on vast numbers of cases in
the shaping of the land use regulatory framework, although a few also appear in
Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. This may be due largely to the common law
traditions in these countries, together with the history of private rights to develop
land, whether through leasehold or fee simple ownership.
H. Regulatory Taking
In the United States, since 1922 at least, a town planning or land use regulation that
goes too far may be treated by courts the same as a physical taking or compulsory
purchase. Usually, to be so treated, the landowner must have been deprived by
regulations of all economically beneficial use of the subject parcel of land. Similar
'regulatory taking' theories appear in Japan and Korea. In Japan, where a town
planning zone designation 'takes' all future use and requires cessation of exist-
ing uses, the landowner is entitled to compensation. In Korea, a designation that
prevents all construction similarly requires landowner compensation.
I. Indigenous Peoples
The accommodation of indigenous peoples, their rights and traditional practices,
often clash with town planning and land use regulatory schemes that are directed
primarily at land development issues. In particular, Australia and New Zealand
are dealing with this emerging land use issue. Australia now allows compensation
for the loss of Aboriginal title in certain circumstances, and case law shows that
those circumstances remain to be finalised, despite some legislation. In New Zea-
land, if the government has no more use for acquired land that was once Maori,
that land is supposed to be offered to the trustees of the tribe that originally owned
it. The government, however, often retains the land.
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J. Colonial Heritage
The land use planning schemes of many countries are rooted in colonial practices
imported from outside the country. This sometimes results in an overlay of out-
side influence over traditional notions of property, particularly if the basic real
property law of the country remains rooted in its pre-colonial history. Australia,
New Zealand, Singapore, Korea and the United States are examples of countries
dealing with some of these issues. For example, New Zealand, Singapore and parts
of Australia use a town planning system similar to that which has characterised
land use control in England (through town and country planning legislation) for
nearly a century.
K. Common Problems
Principal among the problems that commonly arise under the various land use
planning and control systems is enforcement. The pace of development has been
swift in many Asian countries, and violation of planning policy and regulation
is common, particularly in Thailand and Taiwan. Often there is a concomitant
loss of open space and agricultural land to more urban forms of development,
as reported in Korea and Thailand. On the surface, there appear to be fewer en-
forcement problems in Singapore, Japan and the United States. Australia has two
methods of enforcement: its municipal councils criminally prosecute breaches, and
any person can bring a civil case against another to enjoin the action through the
torts of nuisance or negligence. Taiwan and Thailand report a lack of meaningful
public participation in the process such as can be found in common law countries.
L. Eminent Domain
Every country in the study claims the right of government to take or reclaim
private property. Without such a right, public works of any kind would be ex-
tremely difficult to undertake. There is virtually no private landowner defence to
such a governmental exercise of compulsory purchase or reclamation, absent some
clear evidence of bad faith. The only remedy, as appears below, is compensation,
and even this is not necessarily guaranteed. What follows are some general themes
that emerged from the study.
M. Source of Authority
While generally held to be a natural attribute of sovereignty, virtually every
country provides some written authority for exercising its compulsory purchase
powers, generally phrased as some sort of limitation on that power. The majority
of countries provide such articulation/limitation in a constitution, as in the United
States, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand. Many constitutional limitations are
based on the United States' Fifth Amendment, which states that the government
cannot take private property for public use, without just compensation. Australia's
federal Constitution provides limitations only for federal exercises of the power,
and state constitutions are by and large silent. Neither the People's Republic of
China nor Singapore has constitutional provisions on compensation, but both
countries allow for compensation through individual legislative Acts. Singapore's
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Land Acquisition Act of 1966, for example, gives specific instructions for the
process of land acquisition and the requests for and appeals of compensation
amounts. This makes protection tenuous, however, because those laws could be
amended or repealed at any time, leaving land occupiers unprotected from these
governments' landholding policies because no clear constitutional protection ex-
ists. The process for exercising compulsory purchase powers, however, is almost
universally a matter of national or, where relevant, state statutory law.
N. Public Purpose and the Extent of Power
One would expect the extent of the power of compulsory purchase to depend
upon the particular country's view of private rights in land: the more private
rights are recognised, the weaker the power of compulsory purchase. Our study
does not necessarily validate this presumption. Either by common law (US) or
by statute and practice (Malaysia, People's Republic of China, Australia, Singa-
pore and Korea) most of the countries make broad statements of public purpose
as justifications for the exercise of compulsory purchase powers. However, the
People's Republic of China and especially Hong Kong, where there is virtually no
fee simple private ownership of land, contain limitations on the power of eminent
domain. The People's Republic of China limits the taking of interests in land from
collectives. Hong Kong sets out specific purposes for which leaseholds may be
appropriated, although these are sufficiently broad and numerous that they cover
any 'public purpose' Hong Kong terms such compulsory purchase as resump-
tion, and the People's Republic of China views it as 'reacquisition'. Australia, on
the other hand, finds a need to force citizens to be socially and environmentally
responsible, without an even balance being struck with a constitutional protection
of private property at the state level. The Australian High Court has now decided
what is required of the citizen who is sacrificing property for the benefit of the
wider community via a particular government programme, and to what compens-
ation that citizen is entitled. The Court found that, if the Commonwealth obtains
any benefit or advantage from a land acquisition, whether or not the Common-
wealth makes use of that benefit, the original owner deserves compensation for
the loss of that benefit (in this case, mining rights to the land). '
0. Compensation
Virtually every country provides some measure of compensation to the private
owner of rights in property for the interests taken by compulsory purchase.
In many countries, such as the United States, Australia (limited to federal ac-
quisitions), Korea and Malaysia, compensation provisions are found in their
constitutions. Other countries, such as Singapore, provide for compensation by
statute. However, the level and circumstances of compensation vary widely. The
People's Republic of China and Australia provide compensation largely for raw
land value only. Moreover, the People's Republic of China provides for compensa-
tion legislatively, on a fact-specific basis. Thus, for example, one province provides
compensation of five or six times the value of a three-year average output for
I See Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 147 ALR 42.
TAKING LAND
compulsorily taken agricultural land. Many of the countries studied provide for
resettlement costs (People's Republic of China, United States, New Zealand and
Singapore), though the method varies widely. Some provinces in the People's
Republic of China, for example, provide for the cost of relocation plus up to
one month's lost wages for displaced workers. Others provide little or no com-
pensation in particular circumstances (Singapore, People's Republic of China and
Australia), though Australia provides increased compensation up to an additional
10 per cent of market value for 'solatium': 'intangible and non-pecuniary disad-
vantage resulting from the acquisition'. 2 A very few provide for compensation for
a so-called 'regulatory taking' as, for example, when a governmental regulation
prevents virtually all economically beneficial use of a parcel of land. '
Japan is one of the few countries to use the idea of 'land readjustment', whereby
the State returns to the landowner a stake in the 'combined project' for which
the landowner's land was compulsorily taken. Malaysia and Thailand are consid-
ering the concept of exchanging government land for newly appropriated land.
Thailand's problems with its backlog of appropriated land and its inefficient meth-
ods of appropriating that land may be answered by Japan's system or by that of
Taiwan. If a landowner in Taiwan does not want monetary compensation for a
zone expropriation, the government may allow for 'offset land' (land remaining
after construction is complete) to be given as compensation.
P. Due Process
Most countries articulate a need for some minimum process that guarantees cer-
tain procedural rights to the landowner. Several of the countries set out a broad
right of due process in their constitutions (US, Malaysia, Taiwan, Korea and Singa-
pore) although in at least one country (Singapore) the courts have rendered such
process unnecessary by rewriting their statutes to not require compliance with the
due process clause. Some countries require negotiation between landowner and
government to precede some or all exercises of eminent domain (US, Thailand
and Singapore), and most countries provide for negotiation at some stage of the
process. Virtually every country requires notice to be given to the occupier/owner
of the land (or interests therein) to be acquired.
Most countries also provide a process for appealing against, if not the declara-
tion of public purpose, then at least the process or the compensation award. Most
also require at least one public hearing. Some countries provide a specific tribunal
for appeal purposes (Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore). Others grant
extensive compulsory powers to a super-agency that does the bulk of the govern-
ment 'condemnations' (as in Singapore with its powerful Urban Redevelopment
Authority).
2 See Australia Land Acquisition and Compensation Act, s. 44.
3 See the previous discussion under 'Regulatory Taking'.
TSUYOSHI KOTAKA ET AL.
II. Country Summaries
A. Australia
Australia began planning municipalities in the late 1800s to provide its citizens
with residential areas unaffected by industrial smoke or other nuisances.4 Since
the 1920s, many planning schemes began to focus more on environmental conser-
vation and historic preservation. These planning schemes map what is permitted,
what requires permission, and what is prohibited in all sections of cities, states
and territories. Once a state creates its general planning scheme, that scheme is
separated into state and local sections. I If a municipality wants to vary the scheme
based on its unique environmental, cultural heritage or natural disaster concerns,
it must create its own overlay zones to the plan or place conditions on its planning
permits.6 Rezoning and permission for certain projects in discretionary land use
zones require public notice in all cases and environmental impact assessments
for major developments.7 Major planning concerns taken into account at this
point include such things as public amenity, pollution protection,8 environmental
conservation 9 and heritage preservation. 10 An appeals process exists for parties
dissatisfied with initial decisions, 1 be they developers or members of the public
impacted by proposed development.
4 See Robert Freestone, Model Communities: The Garden City Movement in Australia (1989,
Thomas Nelson Australia, Melbourne). Parliamentary debates at this time referred to
the town-planning movement as a justification for land use reforms. For a detailed
history of planning law in the Australian territory of Victoria, see M Raff, 'A History
of Land Use Planning Legislation and Rights of Objection in Victoria' (1992) 22 Monash
University Law Review 90.
5 See Dees Eccles and Tannetje Bryant, Statutory Planning in Victoria (1999), for a more
detailed explanation of Victoria's planning system. See also Tannetje Bryant, R Bvard
and G Testro, Planning and Environment Service (Victoria) (1995, Butterworths, Sydney)
(loose-leaf service).
6 See Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vict.).
7 See ibid, s. 12; and M Raff, 'The Renewed Prominence of Environmental Impact
Assessment' (1995) 12 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 241 at p 251.
8 See Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vict.), s. 84B, which requires that the Vic-
torian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) take account of and give effect to
any relevant State environment protection policy declared in any Order made by the
Governor-in-Council under s. 16 of the Environment Protection Act 1970.
9 See Department of Conservation and Natural Resources v. Robson (1995) 15 Admin App Trib
Rep35.
10 Town and Country Planning Act 1961 (Vict.).
1 In Victoria, the appeals body is the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal; in New
South Wales, it is the Land and Environment Court; in Queensland, the Planning and
Environment Court; in South Australia, the Environment Resources and Development
Court; in Tasmania, the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal; and in
the Australian Capital Territory, the Planning Appeals Tribunal.
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The appeals process for compulsory land acquisition is less regimented. The
federal Constitution requires compensation for land takings, 12 but who gets that
compensation and why remains debatable. A recent High Court decision, New-
crest Mining Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia, found that, for example, a mining
company can be compensated for the loss of income for being unable to use cyan-
ide leaching in a fragile environment, but Aborigines cannot obtain compensation
from the government for taking that same land for preservation. 13
While the Australian Constitution limits federal land acquisition and requires
some compensation, the state constitutions do not. 14 In Australia, state govern-
ments view compulsory acquisition as taking back land previously held privately
before the grant of a freehold tenure to private citizens. " Compensation is there-
fore generally limited to the owner's market value of the land 16 and loss of its
then use, 17 with damages from nearby public projects or changes in the planning
scheme only obtainable through nuisance litigation or other torts. 18 Compensation
for regulatory 'expropriation' is generally unavailable, although the High Court
seems to be leaning towards such compensation for total loss of economic use. 19
The government can use private land for 'public good' with little difficulty. Public
good can include infrastructure such as roads, electrical supply, sewerage and tele-
communications, as well as public health, safety and environmental protection.
Takings for these goals can include either physical use of the property or loss
of the property's title as well as changes in the planning scheme that alter the
uses available to a landowner. The landowner's inherent public responsibility, by
definition, means expropriation may not have occurred. 2
12 See Australian Constitution, s. 51(xxxi): The Australia Parliament may make laws for
the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to '[tihe
acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect
of which the Parliament has power to make laws ... '
13 See Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 147 ALR 42.
14 See New South Wales v. Commonwealth (Wheat Case) (1915) 20 CLR 54.
'5 Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vict.); Lands Acquisition Act 1989
(ACT); Lands Acquisition Act 1994 (ACT); Lands Acquisition Act 1996 (Northern Territ-
ory); Land Acquisition (Just Terms Compensation) Act 1991 (NSW); Acquisition of Land
Act 1967 (Queensland); Land Acquisition Act 1969 (South Australia); Land Acquisition
Act 1993 (Tasmania); and Land Administration Act 1997 (Western Australia).
16 See Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vict.), s. 40 ('Market value [is] ... in
relation to any interest in land on a particular date ... the amount of money that would
have been paid for that interest if it had been sold on that date by a willing but not
anxious seller to a willing but not anxious purchaser').
17 See Pastoral Finance Association Ltd v. Minister [1914] AC 1083.
18 See, for an overview, GM Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (4th edn, 1995, But-
terworths, Sydney). More detail can be found in H Luntz and D Hambly, Torts: Cases
and Commentary (4th edn, 1995, Butterworths, Sydney), and Francis A Trindade and
Peter Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia (3rd edn, 1999, Oxford University Press, South
Melbourne and Oxford).
19 See Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v. Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 147 ALR 42.
20 Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v. Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 480 at
p 510 ('In a case where an obligation to make a payment is imposed ... as a genuine
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B. People's Republic of China
The Chinese Constitution does not provide for compensation for compulsory land
acquisition. Because the State officially owns all land, and only allows collectives,
businesses and individuals merely to use it, 21 the government can reclaim its land
at any time. The People's Republic of China uses specific legislative Acts, not the
Constitution, to calculate damages paid to land users for resettlement and for such
individual national projects as building hydroelectric dams or maintaining flood
control. 22
There are nevertheless some limits to what land government can seize. For
example, land taken from farming collectives or State-owned land that is having
its use changed must be used for the State's economic, infrastructure, defence
or social service projects, all of which are defined by the federal government. 2
Also, State land bureaux must approve any government use of, and construc-
tion on, the land. The failure of either condition results in the failure of the land
appropriation. 24
The government pays for resettlement costs and for probable or real loss of
use, not for how the land might have been used or for emotional loss. The or-
ganisation that will use the expropriated land actually pays the compensation. If
the present land users must be moved before expropriation, the new users must
relocate the old. 25 If the original land users move themselves, the new users must
compensate them. 26 Compensation takes the form of cash, bank deposits or direct
replacement of buildings and/or crops. That compensation must be used accord-
adjustment of the competing rights, claims or obligations of persons in a particular rela-
tionship or area of activity, it is unlikely that there will be any question of an "acquisition
of property" within section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution ... ').
21 PRC Constitution (1988), art. 10 ('Land in the urban areas of cities shall be owned by
the state. Residential district, reserved district and reserved mountain shall be owned
by the collectives.').
22 See eg Rights to the Use of Land Ordinance in Shanxi Gansu Ningxia Remote Area
(1944); Compensation Act for Flood Control Construction in Henan Province (1952);
Expropriation Act for the Construction of the National Project (1953); Amendment for
Country Cooperatives Projects Ordinance (1962); Expropriation Ordinance for National
Projects (1982); Field Law of the PRC (1985); Fishery Law of the PRC (1986); Land
Administration Law of the PRC (1986); Law on Reinstatement of Land (1988); Law
on Compensation, Resettlement Subsidies in Compulsory Land Acquisition for Big or
Medium Water Supply and Hydroelectric Power Plants (1991).
23 Land Administration Law of the PRC, arts 21 and 22. Art. 21 provides: 'When the state
needs to requisition land owned by collectives or to use state-owned land for economic,
cultural or national defence construction projects and for initiating public works ... '
Art. 22 provides: 'Upon approval, construction units may apply for use of land needed
for those state construction projects which are listed in the state fixed assets investment
plan or which may be built in accordance with state provisions'
24 See Land Administration Law of the PRC, art. 25.
25 Ibid, art. 34.
26 Ibid, art. 28(1).
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ing to a plan prepared by the original land user and approved by the expropriating
organisation, 27 with strict disciplinary measures for failure to comply. 28
Each region sets its rules for how the landowner can spend the compensation
and the standards of compensation for resettlement. Calculation of compensation
for land is very specific, and is determined by the use of the land before its ex-
propriation and by a multiple of the average amount earned by that land over a
set number of years. 29 If the land had been used by the State for offices, for the
armed forces or for non-profit-making organisations, the State would pay for the
material costs of the demolished buildings on the land. If the land is to be used
for 'special' purposes, such as for water supply or hydroelectric power plants,
different calculations would be used, based on the specific legislation for those
land uses. 30 Calculations for the loss of residences are based on the material costs
of the buildings, and compensation includes residences in the new location, either
via rent money or by providing the residence itself.
If land compensation and resettlement payments according to the government
formulae still fail to put people back at their original level, restitution follows. 31
The national government decides all of the values, and national policy dictates
what use of the land is most appropriate and by whom.
The land-use planning system in the People's Republic of China appears to
revolve around whether land is designated urban, suburban, rural or mountain.
All cities are owned by the State. Collectives (local forms of administrative rule)
own the suburban and rural areas unless it is designated as State-owned. Because
the government owns all of the land and dictates how that land will be used, the
government, and not the courts, resolves any land disputes. Thus, the government
decides the land use and allows citizens the right to accomplish the government's
goal.
C. Hong Kong
In Hong Kong, the government is the sole ground landlord. 32 Hong Kong's gov-
ernment, as the landlord and planner for the territory, controls every element
of land use through development plans, lease conditions and building control. 3
While the People's Republic of China owns all the land in Hong Kong, the Hong
Kong Government manages the property according to its long-term plans for
27 See ibid, art. 30 ('all kinds of compensation and resettlement subsidies ... shall not be
used for other purposes and shall not be appropriated by any unit or individual').
28 Ibid, art. 49. Art. 155 of Criminal Law (embezzlement) applies to cases with no extenu-
ating circumstances, with sentences ranging from fewer than five years' imprisonment
to death.
29 See ibid, art. 30.
30 See eg Law on Compensation, Resettlement Subsidies in Compulsory Land Acquisition
for Big of Medium Water Supply and Hydroelectric Power Plants.
31 See Land Administration Law of the PRC, art. 29.
32 The Hong Kong Government was described as the sole ground landlord in Shun Shing
Hing Investment Co. Ltd v. Attorney-General [1983] HKLR 433 at p 434.
33 See generally Anton Cooray, 'Town Planning' (Vol. 25) and 'The Environment' (Vol. 11)
of Halsbury's Laws of Hong Kong (Butterworths Asia, Singapore).
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density, location and manner of development. Hong Kong has three population
density zones that are maintained through Building Ordinance Regulations ' and
lease conditions. The government is able to impose lease conditions when leases
are granted, modified or renewed. Lease controls, however, are site-specific. There-
fore, zoning changes can only be implemented piecemeal and sometimes slowly,
because most leases are for 75 years.
Controls that the Building Authority may impose under the Buildings Or-
dinance are also site-specific. The Building Authority is, however, able to effect
planning-type decisions by requiring any building to maintain the appearance of
a neighbourhood. 15 The Building Authority also implements the density controls
of the site's zone, as set out in the relevant plan made under the Town Planning
Ordinance. 36 The Building Authority has no control over any change of use of a
building, unless it involves any building work, such as structural alterations.
Two types of non-statutory plan 37 and two types of statutory plan 38 set the
stage for development in Hong Kong. The non-statutory plans set out standards
and guidelines on such topics as the environment and residential densities, and
create medium- and long-term planning strategies for Hong Kong's five sub-
regions. These territory-wide or regional plans provide the platform for local
statutory development plans. The Town Planning Ordinance allows the Town
Planning Board to grant planning permission, as provided by development plans.
The planning permission process is facilitated by notes attached to the plans. "
The Town Planning Board reviews contested decisions made by either of the
Board's two planning committees. Any applicant aggrieved by a determination
of his planning application by the Town Planning Board may appeal to an inde-
pendent town planning appeal board. The appeal board's decision is final and
conclusive. An appeal board's decision may of course be challenged by way of
judicial review. " There is no public participation in planning permission hearings.
Planning permission is a matter between the applicant/developer and the Town
Planning Board. Planning permission may be unqualified or subject to conditions,
such as that permission will lapse unless the project begins within three years.
The Director of Planning has three methods of enforcement to ensure compliance
with planning controls:4 issuing a notice requiring the development to be done
I4 Namely, Hong Kong Building (Planning) Regulations.
35 See Kemal Bokhary, 'Section 16(1)(g) of the Building Ordinance (Cap. 123): A Shooter's
Guide' (1989) 19 HKLJ 314.
36 See Hong Kong Buildings Ordinance (Cap. 123), s. 16(1)(d).
31 See Hong Kong Territorial Development Strategy; Hong Kong Planning Standards and
Guidelines.
38 Namely, 'outline zoning plans' and 'development permission area plans'.
'9 One column for each zone lists permitted uses, and the other column lists uses requiring
an application for permission from the Town Planning Board. Anything not listed is
never allowed in that zone.
40 Henderson Real Estate Ltd v Wo Chai Wan (1996) 7 HKPLR 1; (1997) HKLRD 258 is an
example of a judicial review application.
4' Hong Kong Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance, No 4 of 1991. See Anton Co-
oray, 'Enforcement of Planning Control in Rural Hong Kong: Reflections on Recent
Legislative Reforms' (1992) 1 Asia Pacific Law Review 108.
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in conformity with the permission granted, 42 requiring the development to be
stopped,"4 or requiring the land to be reinstated to its original use.' If the land
is not covered by a statutory development plan, there is no need to apply for plan-
ning permission. The developer must only meet the requirements of the Building
Ordinance and lease conditions.
Because the government owns all the land, and can regain complete control
upon the expiration of leases, it rarely exercises its powers of compulsory acquis-
ition. It does, however, occasionally reclaim leased land before the lease expires.
The Lands Resumption Ordinance also allows takings if the property has become
a health hazard, is needed for national defence, or is needed for a 'public pur-
pose' " At least one month's public notice is required, and during that time either
the landowner or an interest holder may agree to a voluntary sale. With such an
agreement, the resumption procedure ends, and the transaction becomes a sale. 46
Otherwise, the land still reverts to the government at the end of the notice period,
but within 28 days the government must begin the compensation procedure. "
Compensation is paid on the value of the land (determined by the amount of time
left on the lease), the value of any legally built construction on the property, 48
and the costs of disrupting the owners' 49 and the neighbours'"0 livelihoods. An
appeal may go to the Lands Tribunal against these amounts (which usually relate
to the amount expected if the property were offered on the open market51 ) but not
against the resumption itself. The land user can also appeal against compensation
amounts for takings of easements or parts of his land for roads, railways and air-
port height restrictions. Compensation for property affected by conservation areas
or by changes in land value because of new zoning is rare. Although the Basic Law
of Hong Kong requires compensation only at market value, 12 the government has
learned that to speed the acquisition of land it should pay higher compensation
than legally required.
42 Issued under the Hong Kong Town Planning Ordinance, s. 23(1).
13 Issued under ibid, s. 23(2).
4 Issued under ibid, s. 23(3).
4 See Hong Kong Lands Resumption Ordinance, s. 2.
46 See ibid, s. 4A.
47 Ibid, s. 6(1).
48 Ibid, s. 10(1).
" Ibid, s. 10(2)(c).
50 Ibid, s. 10(2)(b).
51 Ibid, s. 6(3).
52 See Basic Law, art. 105 ('The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall, in ac-
cordance with law, protect the right of individuals and legal persons to the acquisition,
use disposal and inheritance of property and their right to compensation for lawful
deprivation of their property. Such compensation shall correspond to the real value of
the property concerned at the time and shall be freely convertible and paid without
delay.').
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D. Japan
Japan has a multi-tiered system of land planning, from the national to the regional
to the municipal level. All levels of land planning are based on public safety
and the even distribution of industrial and residential zones, while preserving set
percentages of historic and natural areas. The national plan includes such con-
siderations as the use of natural resources, protection from natural disasters, the
location and size of urban and suburban areas, industry locales and projections
of electricity needs for metropolitan areas.53 Because of the rise of land values in
Japan, the country enacted the Land Fundamental Law in 1989, declaring, through
policy objectives, the country's vision of organised development while preserving
public welfare on multiple levels.
Public welfare also controls the expropriation of private land, which is limited
by the Constitution. " Most land expropriation 5 involves negotiation among the
project initiator, the landowner and any other concerned parties, even when it is
the type of project listed under the Land Expropriation Law. 56 The Land Expro-
priation Law is the general statute governing public use compulsory acquisition,
including such infrastructure projects as roads, railways and waste disposal fa-
cilities. If the project planner thinks negotiation will be difficult, he can ask for
'recognition' of the project by the Minister of Land Infrastructure and Transport,
who then sets the extent of land needed, how it will impact the public and the
environment,57 the exact list of interested parties58 and how much compensation
the owner deserves. 9 The recognition process may require less diplomacy, but it
is time-consuming and bureaucratic. 0 Upon recognition, the project initiator has
a year to apply for a 'ruling of acquisition of right' and a 'ruling for evacuation'
from the expropriation committee.61 If any party disagrees with the committee's
ruling, that party may request an investigation by the Minister of Construction62
and bring a lawsuit if the compensation is insufficient. 63
National guidelines decide the compensation required by Japan's Constitu-
tion for the public taking of private or public property.64 Complete physical loss
5 See Tsuyoshi Kotaka, Law of Administrative Activities (1984) pp 79-91; Yoriaki Narita,
Land Policy and Law (1989, Kobundy, Tokyo) pp 46-74.
14 See Japan Constitution, art. 29, 3.
5 See Tsuyoshi Kotaka, Research on Just Compensation (Miejo Law Series 4, 2000, Seibundo,
Tokyo) p 28; Tsuoshi Kotaka, Commentary to the Land Expropriation Law (1980); Michi-
kazu Ozawa, Interpretation of the Land Expropriation Law (revised edn, 1995, Gyosai,
Tokyo).
56 Enacted in 1951 under Japan Constitution, art. 29(3).
5 See Land Expropriation Law, art. 20.
58 See ibid, art. 8(3) proviso.
59 Ibid, art. 71.
60 See ibid, arts 36 and 38.
61 Ibid, art. 47-2, para. 2.
62 Ibid, art. 129.
63 Ibid, art. 133.
64 See Guideline of Standard for Compensation for Loss Caused by Acquisition of Land for Public
Use (1967).
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of private property receives full economic compensation, via market value,
but nothing for potential economic, subjective, emotional, historical or cultural
value. 66 If any party is dissatisfied with the appropriation of the land or the
amount offered in compensation, that person may request an investigation by the
Minister of Construction or file a lawsuit. If a public facility is appropriated, the
project initiator must rebuild it elsewhere, not just pay the replacement value. A
recent decision by the Sapporo District Court is instructive on the definition of
replacement value. 67 The court held the government's taking process relating to
the construction of a dam to be illegal, owing to the failure to consider adequately
the cultural interests of indigenous Ainu property owners.
Some regulations also lower the value of property by limiting its uses. For
example, a regulation that limits the use or lowers the value of a property to
prevent disasters will not be compensated because such a regulation has more
value in public safety and welfare. 6 Zoning 69 and regulations for public works, 70
maintenance 7' and safety also do not require just compensation because they are
seen as forms of public welfare. If the regulation is to protect historical, natural
or cultural sites, however, that kind of regulatory taking requires compensation.
Compensation is paid for the value of the lost use of the land if an actual loss in
property can be proved. 72
E. South Korea
The South Korean Constitution guarantees the property rights of all citizens, in-
cluding just compensation for compulsory acquisition. 73 Strict land use planning
Acts, such as the Urban Planning Act (UPA) and the Building Act, limit constitu-
tional rights of property ownership, particularly concerning construction. If these
restrictions require specific sacrifices by owners, beyond accepted zoning prohibi-
tions, the government may owe compensation, but that is rare. With Korea's small
landmass, general limitations on construction are widely accepted.
Orderly urban growth guides most Korean planning decisions, with both safety
and aesthetics playing a role. In Korea's system of 'specific use areas', planners
65 'Full compensation' has been determined to mean 'just compensation', under the Land
Expropriation Law's adversary doctrine (art. 48(3); art. 49(2)), which is a compromise
between the project initiator, the landowner and other interested parties.
66 See Guideline of Standard for Compensation for Loss Caused by Acquisition of Land for Public
Use, art. 7; ibid, art. 8(4).
67 See Guideline of Standard for Compensation for Loss Caused by Acquisition of Land for Public
Use, art. 7; ibid, art. 8(4).
68 See Masami Takatsuzi, 'Study on Property Right' (1962) 38 Jichi-Kenkyu 4, 3.
69 For an example, see City Planning Law, art. 7.
70 See eg ibid, arts 53, 54; Readjustment of Town Lots Law, art. 76.
71 See eg Road Law, arts 4 and 44; River Law, art. 54; Coast Law, art. 7; Port Law, art. 37;
and Mining Law, art. 64.
72 See Supreme Court, 27 November 1968, 22 Keishu 12, 1402.
73 See South Korea Constitution, art. 23, which guarantees citizens' right to property,
that property rights must conform to public welfare, and that expropriation and just
compensation will be governed by law.
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consider the shape and quality of the land to find its best purpose, and then pre-
vent any contrary uses. After dividing the land into urban and non-urban areas,
the government further divides the land into four non-integrated categories: resid-
ential, commercial, industrial and green. " Each urban area has zoning restrictions
on the type, size and location of buildings and their function. The regulations
governing land use in each area determine the respective landowner's rights. A
landowner will not be compensated for lack of ability to use his land in a manner
that the regulations prohibit.
The 'zone system' determines those development regulations. Zoning attempts
to spread population, services and land uses evenly, including agriculture, parks
and green belts, through four zones: the 'urbanisation control zone', the 'detailed
planning zone', the 'metropolitan planning zone' and the 'development restriction
(green belt) zone'. Once determined, the UPA provides the specific regulations for
the zones. Administrative actions that change a person's land designation may be
considered a taking that requires compensation.
Whether compensation must be paid for such restrictions is being debated
now, because only a 'restriction of private property for public necessity' warrants
compensation under the Constitution. Interpretations of that phrase vary. If, for
example, one owns property that is later rezoned, commentators believe that the
owner makes a special sacrifice and is owed compensation.76 The government
thinks differently: it views rezoning as the constant creation of the expected social
boundaries and limitations of land ownership, which do not require compensa-
tion.77 Under consideration now is the request of people living in the development
restriction zone (DRZ), amounting to 2.2 per cent of the national population, for
compensation through elimination of the zone because of the low economic value
of their property and an arguable lack of 'public necessity' of that type of zone. 7,
Another debate revolves around how much compensation for rezoning is needed.
According to the Constitutional Court, compensation for rezoning to a DRZ is
based on the loss of the original land use value caused by the new land use restric-
tion. 79 The Court also found that the landowner's only particular sacrifice related
71 See ibid, art. 120(2) ('The land and natural resources shall be protected by the State,
ad the State shall establish a plan necessary for their balanced development and
utilization.').
71 Ibid, art. 23(3).
76 Yun Heum Park, A New Lecture on Administrative Law (1997) p 717; Dong Hee Kim,
Administrative Law (1997, Park Young Sa, Seoul) p 315; and Nam Jin Kim, Administrative
Law (1995) p 526. For an argument that it does not require compensation, see Won Woo
Suh, Administrative Law Theory in an Age of Transition(1997) pp 863-76.
77 See Constitutional Court Decision of 3 June 1991 (89 Heon ma 46); Constitutional Court
Decision of 16 September 1991 (89 Heon ma 152); Supreme Court Decision of 8 August
1990 (89 b 2); Ministry of Construction and Transportation, An Opinion to the Con-
stitutional Court Decision of 3 November 1991 (89 Heon ma 213): An Opinion to the
Constitutional Petition Regarding Article 21 of the UPA, 11 November 1993.
78 For more discussion about this debate, see 1 Do Chang Kim, General Theory of Adminis-
trative Law (1990) p 588; 1 Yun Heum Park, A New Lecture on Administrative Law (1997) p
690.
79 See Constitutional Court Decision of 24 December 1998 (97 Heon ba 78).
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to the building site, not the surrounding land, and thus only the loss in value of
the building site would be compensated. 80
Another difference relates to the compensation given to those who accept the
government's offer through consultation" as compared to those who choose ad-
judication.82 When the government wants to physically appropriate private land,
the agency involved must both publicly and directly notify local authorities, the
landowner, the project contractor and other concerned parties. Upon surveying
the land and structures, an offer is made to the owner. Usually the offer is much
lower than that which could be obtained through adjudication by a land commis-
sion. This is an added concern because the number of acquisitions rose from 96 in
1980 to 2,010 in 1991, due in part to strong economic development and a result-
ant increase in the number of public projects. The landowners can agree through
consultation with the government, or appeal against the land appropriation, its
proposed use, the length of that use and the amount of compensation, unless
the property is needed for temporary emergency public safety requirements after
natural disasters or other major accidents. The latter type of land appropriation
cannot exceed six months in duration.
F. Malaysia
While the Malaysian Constitution protects a person's right to own property, 3 that
right is not absolute. All land is vested in the State, and the State allows citizens
to own the land subject to the State's needs. In this regard, only the State is em-
powered to dispose of State land. The government can prescribe categories of land
use on the land's title, impose conditions and restrictions on interests in the land, 4
and reacquire any land ostensibly needed for the country's economic develop-
ment, for public needs or for recreational purposes. The government determines
land use (agricultural, building or industrial) 5 when someone buys or leases land,
thus ensuring that the use conforms to long-term development plans. The use is
documented on the registered document of title. 86 Aside from allowing the owner
to make a living from and enjoy his land, use and enjoyment of land is restricted
to that of lawful use and reasonable enjoyment. 87
The Land Acquisition Act 1960 requires due process for the taking of private
land. Government appropriation is considered valid for any public or recreational
80 See ibid.
81 See Act on Special Cases Concerning the Acquisition of Land for Public Use and
Compensation for Their Loss.
82 See Land Expropriation Act.
83 See Malay. Constitution, art. 13: '(1) No person shall be deprived of property save in
accordance with law. (2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of
property without adequate compensation.'
84 See National Land Code 1965, s. 105.
85 Ibid, s. 52(1).
86 Ibid, s. 78(3).
87 Ibid, s. 103.
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purpose 8 or to improve the economic status of Malaysia,89 all of which are hard
to challenge. 90 However, the landowner is entitled to a hearing during which he or
she may object to the amount of the award or attempt to show malafides on the part
of the State. The government rarely loses such cases, but occasionally the govern-
ment has faced difficulties with the initial application process to acquire land. The
specific government agency must prove that the purpose of the compulsory land
taking is in the public interest or is for the economic development of the nation,
and that the taking is feasible. A new amendment to the Land Acquisition Act of
1991, however, states that, whether or not the government uses the appropriated
land as proposed, the appropriation will remain valid. 91 Only if the appropriation
is not completed within two years of being gazetted (officially advertised) will the
acquisition proceedings be nullified and ownership of the land returned to the
private landowner.
Compensation for government appropriation is based on the owner's present
and future possible uses (if they are not too remote) for the land under existing
planning zones. 92 The values of similar tracts of land in the area help determine
the amount of compensation, 93 and compensation is available only for buildings
on the land that meet regulation codes. 9' No law regulates how to determine the
amount of compensation, but the guiding principle is to put the claimant back
into an economic position equivalent to that before the land was taken. 9' The First
Schedule to the Act explains that compensation is calculated by determining the
market value of the land, 96 any increase or decrease in value because of the anticip-
ated new use, and determining what elements are to be ignored. The landowner
or other interested party can contest the amount, 97 but only if the amount exceeds
88 Ibid, s. 3(1)(c) (1977).
89 See ibid, s. 3(b) (1991) (land may be acquired by a State agency 'from any person or
corporation for any purpose which in the opinion of the State Authority is beneficial to
the economic development of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the public generally or
any class of the public ... .
90 See ibid, s. 8(3).
91 Ibid, s. 68A (1991) ('Where any land has been acquired under this Act, whether before
or after the commencement of this section, no subsequent disposal or use of, or dealing
with, the land, whether by the State Authority or by the Government, person or cor-
poration on whose behalf the land was acquired, shall invalidate the acquisition of the
land.').
92 See ibid, ss. 3(2) and 3A (1997).
9' See ibid, IA of the First Schedule (1997).
9' See ibid, 3A of the First Schedule (1997).
9' See Pentabir Tanah Daerah Gonibak v. Huat Hen' (Luiiz Low & Son.s) Sdn Bid [1990] 3 MLJ
282.
96 See Kho Choon lee v. Superintendent of Lands and Surzeys, Third Division [1972] 1 MLJ
265 (market value is 'the price which an owner willing but not obliged to sell might
reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser with who he was bargaining for
the sale and purchase of the said land').
17 See National Land Code, s. 37.
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RM15,00098 and only if done within a certain time limit." The burden is on the
owner to prove that the amount offered is inadequate. 100 A judge and two land
assessors hear the case, and their judgment is final.
The method of compensation in Malaysia may soon be changed. Instead of
paying the landowner for appropriated property, the government is considering a
system of land exchange within the same area. 101 This method may improve the
landowner's sense of participation, but it has yet to be implemented.
G. New Zealand
A requiring authority,' 2 either through direct negotiations between the govern-
ment and the owner, or by statute, compulsory requirement for public works or an
Environment Court order,'03 may appropriate land in New Zealand. The defining
legislative Acts follow the principles of sustainable management'04 and regulate
takings and compensation for public works. 10' If a requiring authority needs the
land for a public works or utility, the land can be 'designated'. This means that,
once the requiring authority proves its need and the legality of a land taking,
through a public notice and hearing process, the designated land can be taken
despite objections, so long as its planned use legally fits the area's development
plans. 106 The designated land must be acquired for its stated purpose within five
years, or the designation lapses. 107 Any interested person can seek a 'resource
consent' from someone in control of the land. "' The resource consent lasts two
years. 109
New Zealand does not consider compulsory land acquisition 110 as an in-
fringement of property rights, but rather as requiring adequate compensation.
Compensation entails economic replacement for the land on the basis of fair
market value"' and planned use, 112 as well as resettlement costs together with
a small amount for loss of enjoyment. 113 The government also pays compensa-
98 See Re Yeap Char Ee [1932] SSLR 94.
99 See Mohd Saperi Mohd Nasir v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Alor Gajah [1997] 5 MLJ 800.
100 See Ong Yan v. Collector of Land Revenue, Alor Gajah, Malacca [19861 1 MLJ 405.
101 Malaysia is considering introducing land readjustment, as is done in Japan.
102 A 'requiring authority' is a public, civic body or a private company that carries out
public works.0 The Environment Court is a specialist court which reviews takings claims, among other
resource management, planning and conservation questions.
104 See Resource Management Act 1991.
"I See Public Works Act 1981.
106 See Resource Management Act 1991, s. 166.
107 See ibid, s. 184.
108 See ibid, s. 88.
109 See ibid, s. 125.
110 Public Works Act 1981, ss. 23-27, explains the compulsory acquisition of land proced-
ures.
111 See ibid, s. 60(1).
112 Ibid, s. 62(2).
"I Ibid ss. 62-68 (compensation); and ibid, ss. 72-74 (financial assistance).
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tion to affected neighbours, tenants and holders of future estates. 114 Objections
to the proposed compulsory acquisition are heard by the Environment Court,
but the Court does not decide compensation amounts. 1I Compensation must be
negotiated between the parties or decided by the Land Valuation Tribunal.
If the Environment Court reverses the compulsory acquisition, barring appeals
to the High Court, the land must be offered for resale to its original owner, if prac-
ticable. 16 The Public Works Act 1981 defines 'original owner' as 'the person from
whom [the land] was acquired or ... the successor of that person'. 117 Otherwise,
the land may be offered for sale to adjoining landowners or to the public.118 By
default, the land could become Crown land, 119 something the indigenous Maori
continue to fight because they believe the Crown (or State) originally stole the
land from them, and that 'original owner' should mean 'original tribal owner', 120
H. Singapore
Singapore's State Lands Act regulates State land, 121 and sets out four methods of
alienating land from the State to private owners: fee simple, estate in perpetuity,
lease and temporary occupation licence. Two of these methods (the estate in per-
petuity 122 and the lease) are subject to the State's conditions and covenants," and
the leases cannot exceed 99 years. 124 The government can change the conditions
and covenants at any time, with or without notice, and the land grantee or lessee
is bound by the changes. 125 One method, the fee simple, does not include these
conditions, but it is very rare for the State to alienate land in fee simple. 126 A
third method, the temporary occupation licence, is governed by the State Lands
Rules. 127
114 Ibid, s. 63.
115 Ibid, s. 23(3).
116 Ibid, s. 40.
117 Ibid, s. 40.
118 Ibid, s. 42.
119 Ibid, s. 42(3).
120 See Gisborne Ltd v. Smiler, unreported, Court of Appeal, CA No 182/98, 26 April 1999.
121 See Cap. 314 (revised edn, 1988). See generally WJM Ricquier, Land Law (2nd edn, 1995,
Butterworths, Singapore), Vol. 7.
122 See Sheridan, Malaya and Singapore, The Borneo Territories (1961, Stevens, London),
Chapter 13, p 14.
123 See State Lands Act, ss. 4-6; see generally Ricquier, op cit n 121, pp 12-13.
124 Ibid, s. 10 ('The title ordinarily to be issued shall be a lease for a term not exceeding [99]
years.').
125 See ibid, s. 8 ('An assignee of, or any person who becomes a proprietor of any land in
Singapore, shall be bound by such exceptions, reservations, or covenants (restrictive or
otherwise) contained in the Crown grant or lease, or State grant or lease, irrespective
of whether he has notice (actual or constructive) of such exceptions, reservations or
covenants.').
126 Ibid, ss. 14-18.
127 See State Lands Rules 1968, rules 19-25.
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The Planning Act defines all legal rules of planning in Singapore. The Planning
Act includes the 'Master Plan', which is reviewed every five years. It provides the
framework for zoning under which the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA)
and private developers work. 128 Public works and urban planning authorities
can submit proposals for changing their area's master plan at any time. 129 The
Planning Act also contains development and subdivision plans. 130 A landowner
cannot subdivide 13 or develop his property in any way that changes the outer
appearance of buildings or land without getting permission from the authorit-
ies, who look to the master plan. 132 Permission for any changes also requires a
development charge, which is a percentage of the estimated appreciation in the
land's value after the development is complete. 133 Non-compliance at any level is
a criminal offence. 134
One way that Singapore has been able to retain control over its growth is
through the compulsory purchase of land. As of 1975, the State owned about 65 per
cent of the nation's land, compared to 49 per cent in 1969, and the trend towards
increasing State ownership seems to be continuing. 135 Much of the planning work
of the past 30 years has been accomplished by the URA, 136 which is responsible
for accumulating land, planning future growth and resettlement of those whose
land the government takes, preserving history and maintaining property acquired
for future plans. 137 The URA may also declare an area to be an urban development
area, thus setting in motion the government's acquisition of the area within three
years. 138 Other public agencies can also appropriate private land if they can prove
the land is needed for their functions, such as for roads and other public infra-
structure or facilities. 139 While the Land Acquisition Act requires the government
to first attempt private negotiation for land, the courts have ruled that negotiation
is too much of a burden. To speed along acquisitions, the government often resorts
to compulsory purchase.
Singapore amended its Constitution to eliminate a guarantee of adequate com-
pensation for all compulsorily taken property. 140 Now, the Land Acquisition Act
governs compensation. This compensation includes the property's present market
value, damage to land still owned by the private party, resettlement expenses
for home or business, and title fees. The Land Acquisition Act provides that
121 Planning Act, Cap. 232, Pt II, ss. 6-11.
129 See ibid, s. 7.
130 See ibid, Pt III, ss. 12-24.
131 Ibid, s. 12(3).
132 Ibid, s. 3(1).
133 Ibid s. 36(1)- (6).
134 Ibid, ss. 12(4) and 30.
131 See Philip Motha, Singapore Real Property Guide (2nd edn, 1982, Guins Pty Ltd, Singa-
pore) pp 7-13.
136 Established by the Urban Redevelopment Authority Act of 1973.
137 See Urban Redevelopment Authority Act, Cap. 340, s. 6 (revised edn, 1990).
138 See ibid, s. 8.
139 See Street Works Act, Cap. 320A.
140 See Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965, s. 6. See generally S Jayakumar,
Constitutional Law (1976, Malaya L. Reu., Singapore).
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property to be taken requires public notice and advertising in a gazette. 141 Such
'gazetting' is considered sufficient evidence that the property is required by the
government. 142 The advertisement in the gazette also sets the date of acquisition
by the government. ' When the need for the property is particularly urgent, the
government can take the land prior to public notice, if the notice is published
within a week of taking possession. Only 'interested parties' 44 (which does not
include tenants) "4 can apply for compensation, which has no set procedure for al-
location or amount. If a party disagrees with the amount offered, that person must
object immediately or lose the chance of an appeal. The Appeals Board 14 decides
whether to make a payment, and, if so, how much. If the amount is accepted by the
interested party, the collector may take possession of the property upon payment
of the agreed amount. 147
While the regularity and ease of compulsory purchase are beneficial, the level
of compensation has been a cause of concern. In accordance with a formula set
out in the Land Acquisition Act, the date upon which the property is acquired
determines the rate at which the property will be assessed. 148 The market value
is based on retrospective values 149 and the lowest of possible uses, either that for
which the landowner used the land, or that for which the government plans to use
it. 5 0 Improvements made to the land two years prior to government acquisition
are not taken into account, nor, among eight other factors, are the urgency of its
acquisition or the injury caused to the landowner by the land's taking. 1'
I. Taiwan
Taiwan's three-tiered planning'5 2 begins with the national, flows to the regional
and then to the local, with the higher tier guiding the lower one. The national plan
sets the policies for the country and standardises the ideas for regional plans, "3
which focus on development and natural resource preservation. The national plan,
unlike the regional plans,5 ' lacks legal stature. The local plans split between
141 See Land Acquisition Act, s. 3.
142 Ibid, s. 5.
143 Ibid, s. 33(6).
144 Ibid, s. 2.
145 See Cap. 58 (revised edn, 1985).
146 See Lands Acquisition Act, s. 23.
147 See ibid, s. 16.
148 Ibid, s. 33(1) (1995); Collector of Land Revenue v. Ang Thian Soo [19901 1 MLJ 327.
1 See the Lands Acquisition Act, s. 33(1) (1995): the property can be assessed at rates from
as long ago as 1 January 1986, to as recent as 1 January 1995.
150 See ibid.
151 See ibid, s. 34.
152 The highest tier is 'land general development planning'; the middle tier is 'regional
planning'; and the lowest tier is 'urban planning' and 'non-urban land use planning'.
153 Presently, four regional plans exist: Northern, Central, Southern and Eastern Taiwan.
14 The Regional Planning was promulgated under the Regional Planning Law, enacted in
1974.
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regulating land use within the urban and non-urban 155 areas. The urban area156
is divided into several zones. All land use and development in the zones must
conform, or the landowner will be fined and ordered to remove, change or stop
using the building or land. Every five years, the government authority reviews the
zones: residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, conservation, administra-
tion, culture and education, scenic and specific use zones. 157 However, despite the
enforcement mechanisms for these zoning controls, land use violations are evident
everywhere, due apparently to the non-binding status of the national plan and the
lack of serious enforcement efforts by the responsible government authority.
The public has little chance to comment on any of the processes of land use
planning. Aside from a 30-day comment period on creating urban land use zones,
landowners have no opportunity to present their opinions. For example, if land
is zoned as non-urban, landowners can neither complain nor seek compensation.
Instead, the landowners must donate their land and money to the government to
establish the non-developable land for environmental protection. 158
While Taiwan's Constitution provides for property rights 159 it says nothing
about expropriation. The Land Expropriation Act of 2000 fills that gap with the
requirements and methods of compulsory acquisition. 160 Takings are grouped
into general land, political and zoning expropriations. General land takings are
for specific public needs such as national defence, infrastructure, environmental
protection, government facilities, public education and 'others'. 161 The only quali-
fication for these public needs is that government or a government-assigned entity
must operate them. 162 Political land expropriation enables the State to ban private
ownership of certain land, like that within a certain distance from the coast, 163 or
that which is beyond the maximum amount allowed to one owner. 1"4 Although
the law prevents the monopolisation of private land, the government has yet to
expropriate land for that reason. Lastly, government can acquire land in any spe-
cified zone (urban, old urban, agricultural, conservation or non-urban), in whole
or in part, for planned development or improvements. 165
155 Non-urban zones are managed through the Regional Planning Law and the Rules
for the Non-Urban Land Use Control, with options for more than 10 possible zoning
categories.
16 About 444 urban planning areas currently exist.
157 See the Urban Planning Law, art. 32.
158 Based on the Rules for the Non-Urban Land Use Control, yet the Regional Planning
Law only authorises the Ministry of the Interior to enact these rules by executive order.
... See Taiwan Constitution, art. 15 ('the right of property shall be guaranteed to the
people').
160 See the 1930 Land Law, 'Land Expropriation' chapter. See also the Equalization of Land
Rights Act, the Urban Planning Law, the Encouragement of the Upgrading of Industry
Act, the Science-Based Industrial Park Establishment and Management Act, and the
Public Housing Act as further examples of expropriation clauses.
161 See the Land Expropriation Act, art. 3.
162 See ibid, art. 56.
163 See ibid, art. 14.
164 See ibid, arts 28 and 29.
165 Ibid, art. 4.
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The government almost always approves a stated purpose for acquisition,
with little public comment. Unless the land is needed for an emergency, defence,
transportation, water conservation, sanitation or protection of the environment,
the agency must first attempt to negotiate directly with the landowner. Only if
negotiations fail will the land be expropriated. 166 Once public announcement of
the appropriation is made, the landowner can make no changes to the land for
30 days. 167 The negotiation can include relocation of any improvements found on
the land and reimbursement for improvements that cannot be moved 168 Price is
determined by the latest official land price set by the local government together
with replacement costs for any improvements. 16' The government land prices re-
lied upon for compensation are often below market prices, and public officials
would be punished criminally for offering more than the official prices. 170 Indeed,
the Land Expropriation Act does not require market rates, 171 and the government
rates are set every 1 July. Within 15 days after the expiration of the announce-
ment, the promoter of the new development must pay the compensation. 172 If
payment is not made, the appropriation is invalidated, unless the lack of pay-
ment is because the landowner refuses to accept the payment, in which case the
money will be deposited anyway, and the compensation will still be treated as
received. 173 Objections by neighbours and the landowner as to the appropriation
or the compensation amount will be heard and allowed on appeal. 174
In the case of zone appropriation, maps must be filed for approval with the
Ministry of the Interior, 175 and affected landowners can comment within 30 days.
166 Ibid, art. 11.
167 Ibid, art. 23.
168 Ibid, art. 5.
169 As expressly set forth in art. 46 of the Equalization of Land Rights Act, the municipal or
competent city/county government shall, for land within their precincts, survey the up-
dates of land price and evaluate the land prices from time to time and promulgate them
on 1 July every year. The land prices so promulgated by the municipal or competent
city/county government are 'official land price latest promulgated by the government'.
Ibid, art. 46. See also ibid, arts 30, 31, 33 and 34.
170 Art. 131 of the Criminal Code provides that '[a] public official who, either directly
or indirectly, seeks to profit from a function under his control or supervision shall be
punished with imprisonment for not less than one and not more than seven years; in
addition thereto, a fine of not more than 7,000 Silver Dollars may be imposed'.
171 See Land Expropriation Act, art. 30: 'For expropriated land, compensation shall be paid
at the government-promulgated official prices of the current term ... As necessary, an
additional percentage may be provided. The additional percentage shall be proposed
by the municipal or competent city/county government, in line with prices of normal
trading, to the Land Price Evaluation Commission, which will come to a final decision
on the grounds of the government-promulgated official prices of the current term.'
172 Ibid, arts 17, 19 and 20.
173 Ibid art. 26.
174 Ibid, art. 22. Objections are considered by the municipal or city/county government. Ap-
peals may be processed under the Administrative Appeal Law and the Administrative
Litigation Law.
175 Ibid, art. 38.
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If landowners prefer, they can apply for a percentage of offset land instead of full
cash for compensation. 176 Available offset land is defined by whatever is left over
after the development is complete, and should be at least 40 per cent of the ap-
propriated land. 177 After the offset land has been allocated, the rest of the unused
land is designated for such public facilities as roads, parks and schools. 178 Any
remaining land can be sold.
While so many types of legal land acquisition may make public undertakings
simple, Taiwan relies heavily on the process without consistently protecting the
right to private property. For example, in 1997, the government expropriated 2,275
hectares, and in 1999, the government expropriated 5,893 hectares. 179 Proving need
is easy for the State, 8 0 and constitutional protection has become secondary at best.
Other national Acts uphold the Constitution, but are seemingly ignored. 181 When
the federal government is looking for land to appropriate, landowners, local gov-
ernment agencies and other affected landowners get little to no chance to speak.
As a result, until recently, almost all land appropriations have been approved.
!. Thailand
Thailand has divided its land use planning into multiple levels, beginning with a
five-year National Economic and Social Development Plan which determines the
national framework, by providing guidelines for land use planning at regional,
provincial and district levels, as well as town plans. Therefore, all of the regional,
provincial, district and town plans are to some extent consistent with one another.
Thailand's rapidly expanding population undermines its specific planning laws,
especially conservation laws, which are not strictly enforced. While the Town Plan-
ning Act of 1975 was designed to control urban land use through zoning, it has not
been effective even though it has been amended twice. People buying agricultur-
ally zoned land have converted the land to non-agricultural uses to make it more
profitable, '82 with no repercussions. 183 Agricultural land takes precedence over
176 Ibid, art. 40.
177 Ibid, art. 33.
178 Ibid, art. 44.
179 From statistics released by the Ministry of the Interior for the years 1997-99.
180 About 50 years ago, Shih Shang-kuan, a well-known expert in Taiwanese law, said of
Taiwan's land expropriation methods: 'Very seldom can one find throughout legislation
the expropriation procedures as oversimplified as the Land Law of our country.' Shih
Shang-kuan, The Theory of Land Law (1951, Cheng-Chung Bookstore) p 522.
181 Land Law, art. 208 ('The land expropriation shall be limited to the scope only as in-
dispensable to promotion of the undertaking.'). Enforcement Rules of Land Law, art. 49
('Land expropriation shall be carried out within the scope, not against the expropriation
objectives at the least possible damage.').
182 According to the Office of Agricultural Economics of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperatives, between 1986 and 1988 the main rice production region (Central Region)
lost much of its agricultural land to residential, commercial and industrial areas.
13 No laws presently prohibit land subdivisions.
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forests, 14 the density of urban centres continues to increase, and the pressures for
land increase. 185
The Constitution of Thailand includes the right to private property 18 6 The Con-
stitution gives the government the right to compulsory acquisition, 187 but only if
a specific law allows acquisition for a specific use. 8 Acquisition must be for the
public good, and compensation must be fair and paid within a reasonable period
of time. 189
Several specific laws allow for the acquisition of property. The Immovable
Property Acquisition Act of 1987 allows the State to expropriate real estate prop-
erty, and other statutes specifically allow for the acquisition of property for such
uses as airports, railways, highways and industry. 190 Agencies follow a series of
steps towards acquisition, from requesting that the property be donated, to nego-
tiation for sale, to issuing a royal decree or applying the Immovable Property Act
to that specific property. Compensation then entails the government's valuation of
the land and its assets, damage to properties, demolition costs of any immovable
properties, labour and material costs, inconvenience and a computation of the
value of the land prior to acquisition versus its prospective value. Negotiation
ensues, with appeals available. 191
Because of rising competition for land, negotiations often break down, which
can cause endless delays, because the executing agency can only take over the
property when the compensation has been fully paid. The appropriation process
lacks efficiency, inter alia, because of public protests, obstructions to government
projects and lack of formulae for calculating compensation amounts. 192 The lack
of formulaic methods also means that many experience long delays in receiving
their compensation, making landowners less likely to co-operate, and extending
the appeals process. Because it takes so long to acquire the amount of land needed,
public works projects often take 20 years to complete, leaving some appropriated
land to lie unused the entire time. Thailand, like Malaysia, is considering trying
..4 See Office of Agricultural Economics, 'Number of Agricultural Households and Av-
erage Farm Size Between 1981-1995' Average farm sizes have continued to shrink
between 1981 and 1995.
185 See Ministry of the Interior, Population Census of 1909, 1919, 1929, 1937 and 1947.
Thailand's population increased from 26 million to 61.5 million between 1960 and 1998.
186 Thailand Constitution, s. 48, cl. 1 ('The property right of a person is protected. The
extent and the restriction of such right shall be in accordance with the provisions of the
law.').
187 See ibid, s. 49.
188 Ibid. ('The expropriation of immovable property shall not be done except by virtue of
the law specifically enacted for the purpose of...
189 Ibid. ('... and fair compensation shall be paid in due time to the owner thereof as well
as to all persons having the rights thereto, who suffer loss by such expropriation, as
provided by the law').
190 See eg Airport Authority of Thailand Act 1979, s. 32; State Railway of Thailand Act 1981,
s. 37; Highways Act 1992, s. 68; Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand Act, 1979, s. 32.
191 See Immovable Property Acquisition Act, ss. 9, 10, 23, 25 (clause 2) and 28.
192 Communication from Justice Prapant Subsaeng of the Thailand Supreme Court (un-
dated; on file with authors).
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the concept of land readjustment, as is done in Japan, 193 but whether that will help
make the process more efficient and reduce the backlog remains to be seen.
K. United States
Land use controls in the United States are generally exercised at the local gov-
ernment level. The most effective of these controls is zoning, which is used
by local governments to divide regions into use districts. Statutes permit local
governments to divide their jurisdictions into zones with permitted uses and
restrictions. 194 Another local land use method that has gained popularity is the
subdivision process, which requires an area of land to be completely platted and
those plats to be approved before lots can be sold to individuals, who will develop
their lot according to the approved plan. Subdivisions must include plans for their
own infrastructures and public facilities, as well as dedicating open spaces and
public buildings, thus managing local growth and expenditures. 115 In the same
vein, developers must often pay impact fees to the community that provides the
subdivision with such public facilities as sewers and roads, both on- and off-site,
but only if the improvements can be found to be required because of the subdivi-
sion. 196 Building (prospective) and housing (retroactive) codes set out minimum
standards for the health, safety and welfare of the public.
Some states have reclaimed their land use control 17through regional19 or
state-wide1 99 zoning and planning. Often this is to protect a resource and to control
193 This method of the government trading land for land could potentially reduce the
State's costs. No legislation specifically supports the concept yet, and it is being run
only on a trial basis.
19 A model Standard Zoning Enabling Act from 1923, drafted by the US Department of
Commerce, usually forms the basis for the state statutes.
195 See Eric Damian Kelly, Managing Community Growth: Politics, Techniqutes and Impacts
(1993, Praeger, Westport, CT) p 16.
196 David L Callies, 'Impact Fees, Exactions and Paying for Growth in Hawaii' (1989) 11
University of Hawaii Law Review 295; Brian William Blaesser and Christine M Kentopp,
'Impact Fees: The Second Generation' (1990) 38 Washington Journal of Urban and Contem-
porary Law 55; Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure: Paying the Costs of
Growth Through Impact Fees and Other Land Regulation Charges (1985, Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy Monograph 85-5); and R Freilich and D Bushek (eds), Exactions, Impact Fees
and Dedications(1995, American Bar Association, Chicago).
197 See Fred P Bosselman and David L Callies, The Quiet Rcvolution in Land Use Control
(1971, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC); Robert Healy and John Rosen-
berg, Land Use and the States (2nd edn, 1979, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore);
Thomas G Pelham, State Land Us' Planning and Regulation (1979); and John M DeGrove,
Land, Growth and Politics (1984, American Planning Association, Chicago).
198 For discussions of these systems and the 'takings' cases challenging them, see Bossel-
man and Callies, op cit n 197; DeGrove, op cit n 197; and Fred P Bosselman, David
L Callies and John Banta, The Taking Issue (1973, US Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC).
199 For example, Hawaii, Florida, Vermont and Oregon.
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developments that impact an entire region."2 Also, the federal government has
overriding statutes and implementing regulations for clean air20' and water, 202 for
managing coastal zones,"' and for protecting known flood zones. 204 Regulations
that leave a landowner without an economically beneficial use require compens-
ation as if the land were compulsorily purchased. Regulations that deprive a
landowner of some, but not all, economic use, may require compensation, depend-
ing upon such factors as the investment-backed expectations of the landowner and
the character of the governmental action.
As with land use controls, local, state and federal governments all have the
power to acquire land by compulsory purchase. The United States Constitution
limits this ability, however, by requiring that such a taking must be for a public use,
and the private owner must be justly compensated. 205 Compensation is generally
calculated for the value of the land and its present improvements (or the loss of
value, depending upon the kind of taking involved) at the time of the confiscation,
with no consideration given to the future worth of the property after its confiscated
use. 206 Various local government authorities have the right to condemn private
200 For a general overview, in Japanese, see David L Callies, Land Use Controls in the US
(1994, trans Makitaro Hotta, Horitsu Bunku Sha, Kyoto). See also, for various analyses
of land use law, David L Callies, Preserving Paradise: Why Regulations Won't Work (1994,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu); David L Callies, Regulating Paradise: Land Use
Controls in Hawaii (1984, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu); Bosselman and Cal-
lies, op cit n 197; Daniel R Mandelker, Environmental and Land Controls Legislation (1976,
Bobbs-Merrill, New York); Phyllis Meyers, Zoning Hawaii (1976, Conservation Founda-
tion, Washington, DC); David L Callies, 'Land Use Control in an Island State' (1980) 2
Third World Planning Review 187; David L Callies, 'Land Use' (1979) 2 University ofHawaii
Law Review 167; Tom Dinell, 'Land Use Zoning in a Developing State' (1980) 2 Third
World Planning Review 195; Daniel R Mandelker and Annette Kolis, 'Whither Hawaii?
Land Use Management in an Island State' (1979) 1 University of Hawaii Law Review 48;
Daniel R Mandelker, Land Use Law (4th edn, 1997, Michie Co., Charlottesville, NC);
Julian Juergensmeyer and Thomas Roberts, Land Use Planning and Control Law (1999,
West Group, St Paul, MN); and Peter A Buchsbaum and Larry J Smith (eds), State and
Regional Comprehensive Planning (1993, American Bar Association, Chicago).
201 Clean Air Act, 42 USC ss. 74 0 1-7671q, ELR Stat. CAA ss. 101-618.
202 Clean Water Act, 33 USC ss. 1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA ss. 101-607.
203 See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 USCA ss. 1451-1465, ELR Stat. CZMA ss.
302-319. For general description and comments, see Sarah Chassis, 'The Coastal Zone
Management: An Introduction' (1978) Am. Bar. Found. Res. 1. 153; Fred P Bosselman
et al, Federal Land Use Regulations (1977, Practicing Law Institute, New York); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Land Use Controls in tlit, United States (1975, Dial Press, New
York); Daniel R Mandelker, Environmental and Land Controls Legislation (1976), Bobbs-
Merrill, New York).
204 Federal Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 USC ss. 4056 et seq.
205 US Constitution, Fifth Amendment. V. For an overview of eminent domain in the US,
see Gideon Kanner, Just Compensation, and AP Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain
(revised edn, 1997, ed E Kelly, Matthew Bender and Co., New York).
206 See eg Haw. Rev. Stat. s. 101-24.
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land for such things as housing,2 °7 airports, 208 convention centres 2 9 and other
public purpose projects. Public utility corporations may also acquire land through
compulsory purchase because of their quasi-public functions. To allow for taking
immediate possession and use of a condemned property, quick take provisions
often require the condemnor to pay a deposit of sorts with the court, which then
orders surrender of the property. 210
A non-negotiable condemnation action usually begins with an agency filing
a complaint in court. 211 The complaint must include the government's plans for
the land and a specific mapping of it. 212 The court summons all interested parties
to decide on a fair price and to verify that the government will use the land as
claimed.
Most federal agencies try to negotiate with landowners during the process of
compulsory Purchase. 213 The property is appraised, with the owner able to com-
ment on various values that may not be readily apparent. The sales records of
comparable properties are checked; replacement costs, loss of business and the fate
of tenants are all considered in the compensation process. Often not considered
are such things as business goodwill, loss of future business, frustration of plans
and costs of removing buildings or fixtures, unless specifically provided for in
the statute. 214 Once an offer is made, either the owner can agree or condemnation
proceedings may begin in court.
Not only must the landowner be fairly compensated for the highest and best
use of the land, but he must also be given 'due process': 215 fair notice of the gov-
erunent's intent to acquire the property 216 and a day in court if he so desires.217
In California, for example, if a landowner can prove that the particular agency
does not possess appropriate compulsory purchase power, that the proposed use
will not be public, that the property will be used for a different purpose, that
the property will not be used within a set amount of time, or that the property
is not subject to compulsory purchase for that purpose, the landowner can keep
his land. 218 The government must also be careful not to take more land than it
207 The Hawaii Housing Authority is an example. Haw. Rev. Stat. s. 356-18.
208 See eg the Airports Division of the Department of Transportation, Haw. Rev. Stat. s.
261-4(b).
209 See eg the Convention Center Authority, Haw. Rev. Stat. ss. 208X et seq.
210 Ibid. See Title III of the Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Act of 1970, 42 USC s. 4604.
211 See eg Haw. Rev. Stat. s. 101-15.
212 See eg Haw. Rev. Stat. s. 101-16.
213 See Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,
42 USC s. 4604.
214 Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2000, West Group, Chicago), Vol. 11, ss. 32.92
and 32.92c.
215 The right of due process, like compensation, derives from the US Constitution's Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
216 See In the Matter of the Decision of the State of South Dakota Water Management Board
Approving Water Permit No 1791-2, 351 NW 2d 119 at p 123 (SD 1984).
217 Ibid See also Weiner v. State of Nebraska Department of Roads, 137 NW 2d 852 (Neb. 1965).
218 Santa Cruz County Redevelopment Agency v. Izant, 37 Cal. Rptr 4th 141 (1995).
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needs, and to avoid so publicising the land's eventual condemnation that it lowers
the value of the to-be-condemned land. Sometimes the government can prove the
necessity for excess condemnation,219 but if it ever abandons the use for which the
land was initially condemned, statutes often require that the property be resold to
the original condemnee.
III. Conclusion
Given the diversity of history, culture and politics in the Asia-Pacific region, it is
at one level surprising to find so much similarity among systems of compulsory
purchase and town planning/land use controls. Most countries require some sort
of public use or purpose for the compulsory acquisition of land, and many provide
for compensation. Most countries base their land use controls on some sort of plan
or planning process. Most countries require some measure of due process, particu-
larly with respect to compulsory purchase, though all might not necessarily define
such due process in the same way. Finally, those countries with a British colonial
heritage often owe the structure, if not the content, of their town planning system
to England.
One would expect, of course, to find differences, and there are those aplenty.
One of the most significant is the absence in most countries of the US concept
of a regulatory taking. Compulsory purchase and land use controls are generally
regarded as legally separate concepts (as indeed they were in the United States
until 1922) and the idea that a regulation, if it goes 'too far' may result in the
equivalent of a compulsory physical taking is only slowly taking hold in one or
two countries. Equally significant is the dearth of private fee simple ownership
in a few countries, with long-term leases serving as a land use control mechan-
ism (along with more traditional controls) as well as the basis for holding and
developing private property.
Lastly, in some countries, the mechanics of due process is increasingly the
subject of much scrutiny as the infrastructure needs of growing urban (and, in
some instances, rural) areas drives the need for major public works projects such
as roads, wastewater and water delivery systems, and public educational centres.
Much of these will perforce be constructed on pri vate land (or land subject to long-
term leases) that is not necessarily viewed as fungible (as, for example, most land
is viewed in a relatively new nation like the United States). How the basic public
purpose behind compulsory purchase for such facilities can be reconciled with
occupation and use of the land for centuries by the same families is of considerable
importance to many Asia-Pacific countries seeking to provide fairness and avoid
disruption for those citizens who bear the burden of such compulsory purchase
for which compensation alone may not be viewed as an adequate remedy.
219 David L Callies et al, 'Value Capture Policy' (1976) 42 Planning 22 (October); AP Nichols,
The Law of Eminent Domain (3rd edn, 1976, Matthew Bender and Co., New York), Vol. 2,
s. 7.516.
